University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1922

Election of Remedies
Amos S. Deinard
Benedict S. Deinard

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Deinard, Amos S. and Deinard, Benedict S., "Election of Remedies" (1922). Minnesota Law Review. 828.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/828

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

MINNESOTA

LAW REVIEW
Vol. 6

APRIL, 1922

No. 5

ELECTION OF REMEDIES
By Axos S. DEINARD AND BENEDICT S. DEINARD*
HE rule of election of remedies is to the effect that the choice
of one among inconsistent remedies bars recourse to the others.!
The requirements for operation of the rule are all implied in its
definition. Two remedies in fact must coexist.' Otherwise, choice
would be impossible. The remedies must be in law inconsistent.!
Otherwise, choice of one could not conceivably be prejudicial.
The remedies must exist for the same wrong. Otherwise, there
could be no necessity for choice.
The entire significance of the rule thus lies in the fact that
it works to preclude resort to further remedies. Thereby it makes
a choice between inconsistent remedies conclusive and irrevocable
from the start. Nothing in the law would seem better settled
than this result. It has been repeated in almost identical terms in
numberless cases in every jurisdiction.! It has attained to the
sanctity of a legal maxim, and is quoted with the same platitudinous assurance. In the profound manner of Ulpian when he
allowed himself to proclaim that "just as the Greeks say, some
laws are written and some unwritten,"' so judges thrill to an-

T

*The authors are graduate students at Harvard Law School.-Ed.
"Moss v. Marks, (U904) 70 Neb. 701, 97 N. W. io31.
'Bierce v. Hutchins, (1906) 205 U. S. 340, 27 S. C. R. 524, 51 L. Ed.
828.
'Zimmerman v. Harding, (1912) 227 U. S. 489, 33 S. C. R. 387, 57 L.
Ed. 6o8.
'20 Corpus Juris, sec. iS ff.
'Institutes, I, 2, sec. 3.
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nounce that "when a man has two inconsistent remedies, by pursuing one he bars resort to the other."
But this rule, of such easy definition and simple consequence,
requires a more searching analysis, to enable us to discover its
meaning and the basis of its operation. Granted the uniqueness
of its effect, which is so consistently admitted, is there any corresponding definiteness in the situations to which it is properly to
be applied? The definition can give no more than the formal incidents and conclusion of the rule ex vacuo. The problems lie
-deeper. When are legal alternatives to be classified as remedies?
When and why are they inconsistent in law? What constitutes
a choice or election between them?
Anyone who. supposes that the rule is of easy application need
only glance at the digests, with their hundreds of heterogeneous
cases grouped under the caption of "Election of Remedies," to
be convinced that the compilers at least have not found it so. Under the purported guidance of the rule, the courts have settled
diverse questions of law having few if any points of similarity.
The only thread of identity that runs through them all is the assumed conclusiveness of choice. Consider, for instance, this
simple statement: "The term has been generally limited to a
choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights,"' in support of which the following is adduced:'
"Thus, 'if a man maketh a lease, rendering a rent or a robe,
the lessee shall have the election: Co. Lit. 145a. So a man may
ratify or repudiate an unauthorized act done in his name. . .. He
may take the goods or the price when he has been induced by a
fraud to sell. . . . He may keep in force or may avoid a contract
after the breach of a condition in his favor,' Bierce v. Hutchins.
205 U. S. 340, 346, 27 S. C. R. 524, 51 L. Ed. 828."
It will be submitted that none of the examples in fact involve
an election between remedies. To suppose the contrary is simply
to assert that every irrevocable choice, or election, is an election
between remedies. So stated, such an assertion is patently false.
Yet from this assertion, implicity made, the confusion in the
cases proceeds. Election of remedies is taken to comprehend the
entire field of election: the inevitable consequences of an election in some other department of the law are predicated as of
course to an election between remedies. No necessity for disCorpus Juris, sec. I.
'2o Corpus Juris. sec. i, N. 3a.
'2o
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crimination is considered: "Election" and "conclusiveness" are
assumed to rest in a preordained and universal harmony.
It is therefore necessary to consider the meaning and scope
of "election" as a descriptive term, to ascertain the occasions of
its occurrence, and to distribute the cases properly.
ELECTION

"Election," in its generic sense, describes the right or duty of
a person faced by a given situation to make a definitive choice between various courses of action. It may as well mean a choice
of substantive rights in a given transaction as a selection of remedies for a specific wrong. "An election is the choice between
two or more courses of action, rights or things, by one who cannot enjoy the benefits of both."' As the nature of the situation
is different in almost every case, so a priori the right to elect may
mean quite different things. Originally underlying every case is
only the simple necessity of selecting one possibility and discarding the others. "For the situation in all classes of cases is to this
extent the same: One person is possessed of the right of choice
(between two properties, between continuation and termination
of a contract, between two remedies), and some other person's
interest will be affected by the choice. So far there is identity.; but
it may very well be that for the proper adjustment of rights, different rules may be found to be necessary for the different classes
of cases."'
It is a difficult matter to dissolve this complexity of situations.
We have found no better analysis or classification than that made
by Mr. Ewart in his brilliant polemic on "Waiver Distributed
among the Departments: Election etc." He, it is true, was concerned primarily with the demolition of the concept of "waiver."
But he found that "waiver" on a true interpretation of the facts
can -be nothing but an "election" based upon contract, or, less
frequently, an estoppel, contract, or release. And he found it
possible to classify all the important cases of election in the following way:
"1. Election between two properties;
2. Election (part of the substantive law) between termination and continuation of contractual relations; in other words,
election between two legal situations;
"Allis v. Hall, (1904) 76 Conn.
'Ewart, Waiver 71.

322, (339),

56 At. 637.
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3. Election (part of. the adjective law) between two or more
remedies.""0
It is to the third category, that of election of remedies, that
the present inquiry is directed. For to that category only the socalled rule of election of remedies by definition applies. But we
shall first briefly discuss the necessity and consequences of an
election in the two other categories, with the view of tracing their
relationship, if any, to an election between remedies. We shall
therefore follow the schema of Mr. Ewart.
ELECTION BETWEEN PROPERTIES

Between Property and Devise. This doctrine of election, often known as the doctrine of equitable election, is of restricted
operation, and is pertinent in this connection only as it will furnish useful analogies, and as it may help to explain the derivation
and basis of the related rule of election of remedies. The most
familiar instance of the doctrine is that of election under a will,
as where a testator in disposing of his own property purports to
dispose of property that does not belong to him. X devises land
to A upon condition that A transfer his own property to B, or release an obligation running to A from B. A must elect whether
to take under the will or against it. Mr. Jarman seemed to consider the doctrine as necessary to the unified interpretation of the
will, in order to carry out the testator's intent." "The doctrine
of election," he said, "may be thus stated: That he who accepts
a benefit under a deed or will, must adopt the whole contents of
the instrument, conforming to all its provisions and renouncing
every right inconsistent with it." Mr. Pomeroy thought the doctrine an expression of the Chancellor's maxim that "He who seeks
equity must do equity."" Mr. Ewart explains it on the ground
of the "attachment of a tacit condition to the gift."'
These are
the varying views of the commentators. Among the English
Chancellors and Judges there was as great diversity of opinion.
"Ewart, Waiver 67.
"For analogous cases see Bigelow, Estoppel, 5th Ed., 673 ff.
"Jarman, Wills, 6th Eng. Ed., 538. The editors seem to have repudiated Mr. Jarman's idea, for in another place they say: "The doctrine does not depend on any supposed intention of the testator, but is
based on a general principle of equity." Ibid. 534. This view is supported by the holding that the doctrine applies when a gift is made under an erroneous belief of ownership. Whistler v. Webster, (1794) 2
Ves. Jun. 367. But see i Sw. 401.
"Pomeroy, Equity, Jur., 3rd Ed., sec. 395, 461, 466.
"Ewart, Waiver 68.
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Lord Commissioner Eyre declared: "There never can be a case
of election, but upon a presumed intention of the testator."'" Lord
Rossalyn represented Chief Justice de Grey to have referred the
doctrine to a natural equity as distinguished from an implied
condition." But it has been said that "Lord Chief Justice de
Grey meant to state the distinction, not between an implied condition and an equity, but between an express condition, and an
equity arising from an implied condition.""
Lord Redesdale
said: "The rule of election, I take to be . . . a rule of law, as
well as of equity." But Lord Hardwicke and Lord Eldon described the right as founded on a benevolent equity alone.'
In Sherman v. Lewis," Judge Mitchell excellently summarized
the basis of an election. "It must be clear," he said, "beyond
reasonable doubt that the testator has intentionally assumed to
dispose of the property of the beneficiary, who is required on that
account to give up his own gift." Thus, in Brown v. Brown,' X,
the owner of an entire city lot, deeded one quarter to her son A,
who built a house and resided there; afterwards X by will devised to A and his two brothers, share and share alike, the entire
lot including the quarter previously deeded to A. It was held
that A must elect whether to accept the share of the property devised to him and consent to its disposition as provided in the
will, or to retain the part he owned.
Between Dower and Devise. We have considered a situation in which the testator gives away property already belonging
to the devisee, in return for the devise. Once the law was settled,
each case required only a fair interpretation of the document under which the devisee claimed. But the application is complicated
when the devisee has only a spouse's interest in the testator's
property. If X devises land to his widow A, must A relinquish
her right to dower in the other lands disposed of by the will, in
order to claim the devise? If X really intended A to take her
devise only on condition of giving up her dower interest in the
other lands, there would be a clear case for election between her
"Crosbie v. Murray, (1792)

I Ves. Jun. 555 (557).
'Rutter v. MacLean, (1799) 4 Ves. 531 (538).

"Dillon v. Parker, (1818) 1 Sw. 359, Note at 4O ff.
"Birmingham v. Kirwan, (i8o5) 2 Schoales & Lefr. 444 (45o); Gretton v. Haward, (1818)

I Sw. 4o9, Note at 425 ff.

"(18go) -44 Minn. 107, 46 N. W. 318. Acc., Washburn v. Van Steenwyk, (1884) 32 Minn. 336, 30 N. W. 324; Johnson v. Johnson, (1884) 32
Minn. 513, 21 N. W. 725; In Re Gotzian, (1885) 34 Minn. I59, 24 N. W.
920.
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claims as devisee and as doweress. But since there was rarely
any express direction to this effect, the common law Nvas driven
to presumptions. In case of a general devise, A was not required
to elect, for it was said that X had not intended the devise in satisfaction of dower. However, if X introduced into the devise a
special provision irreconcilable with A's claim of dower, then the
expression of the testator's intention was unequivocal, and A was
forced to elect between her dower and the benefits under the will."1
The test was regarded as one of intention to be collected from
the whole will. '
Since the Statute of 1834, in England dower may be barred
by a general disposition of the property, by an incumbrance
placed thereon, by a declaration in the will, or by various gifts in
satisfaction of dower. In these cases A cannot disappoint the
will but must elect between its terms and her right of dower.'
ere
The same doctrine of election between dower and devise, wil
the testator intended the devise to be in lieu of dower, prevails in
the United States. Page states the rule as follows :"
"Where it is clear, either from specific provisions, or from
the will as a whole, that the testator intends a provision for the
surviving spouse to be in lieu of the curtesy or dower rights of
such surviving spouse, full effect is to be given to such intention.
and the surviving spouse must then elect between the two provisions."
This intention may be declared by express language, or may be
created by necessary implication, as where it would be impossible
to effectuate the provisions of the will if the surviving spouse
were allowed to take both devise and dower interest.
By statute Minnesota has repudiated the common law rule."
The Statute now in force enacts" that if a deceased parent by will
2'(i890) 42 Minn. 270, 44 N. W. 250.
"Jarman, Wills, 6th Eng. Ed., 547 ff.
'In Re Harris, [1909] 2 Ch. 2o6, 23 H. L. R. 138.
233 & 4 Will. 4, c.IO5.
Snell, Principles of Equity, Ch. on Election;
"Page, Wills, sec. 71.
Stalman, Law of Election, Appendix (1827).
'The first statute of the state provided that a devise in the will should
be in lieu of a widow's right unless a contrary intention "plainly appears by the will to have been so intended by the testator." See Rev.
St. 1851 c.49, sec. 18, i9; Gen. St. 1866, c.48, sec. i8, 19; Page, Wills, sec.
713. Then by statute abolishing dower (Gen. Laws 1875 c.4o) the common law rule was revived, under which it was "so well settled that the
widow is entitled to both the statutory and testamentary provisions, un-

less a contrary intention appears from the will .

.

.,

the presumption is

that a legacy or devise is intended as a bounty, and not as a purchase or
satisfaction of the statutory provision for the wife." McGowan v.
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makes provision for a surviving spouse in lieu of statutory rights,
if such spouse fails to renounce the provisions of the will by a
writing filed in the probate court within six months after probate, such spouse is deemed to elect to take under the will. Further, provision in the will for the surviving spouse is presumed
to be in lieu of statutory rights, unless the contrary appears.
ELECTION BETWEEN CONTINUATION AND TERMINATION OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS.

The law of election between properties, it has been shown, applies to one definite and restricted problem. It originates in inconsistent or alternative donations; "a plurality of gifts, with intention, express or implied, that one shall be a substitute for the
rest. In the judgment of tribunals, therefore, whose decision is
regulated by that intention, the donee will be entitled, not to both
benefits, but to the choice of either."'" On the other hand, the
law of election of the second type (described as election between
continuation and termination of contractual relations) occurs
throughout the substantive law. It is an important part of the
law of sales, contracts, insurance, landlord and tenant, etc. It
rests not on claims of equity, but on the logical impracticability
of the contemporaneous assertion of contrary rights. An investigation of the rights arising from its exercise concerns the substantive law in the branches above mentioned, and would be entirely beyond the purpose of this inquiry, which is to deal primarily with .remedial rights, and the nature of an election between
them. But a general analysis of the nature of substantive election is necessary here to point the distinction from the other category of election of remedies. For as has been said the rule of
election of remedies strictly is concerned only with rules of the
adjective law. And the great difficulty into which the subject
has fallen is traceable to the disregard of this essential fact. The
courts have mingled wholly dissimilar cases; they have refused
Baldwin, (i891) 46 Minn. 477, 49 N. W. 251, (widow not required to
elect between her homestead rights and a general devise in her husband's
will).
" Gen. Laws 1897, c.24o; Amending sec. 4472 Gen. St. 1894. R. L. 1913,
sec. 7238 (same, R. L. 19o5, sec. 3649). Where widow elects under a

will in lieu of dower, it bars her dower in property deeded by testator

during coverture. Fairchild v. Marshall, (i89o) 42 Minn. 14, 43 N. W.
563; Howe v. Parker, (I9o8) 105 Minn. 3io, 117 N. W. 518; Eddy v.
Kelly,
(1898) 72 Minn. 32, 74 N. W. 1O2O.
2'(1818) 1 Sw. 394. N. 6.
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to recognize any material distinction between rights and remedies,
in considering the necessity and consequences of an election.
This confusion has arisen both from a deficiency in terminology, and from a habit of regarding rights in terms of pleadings.
"Election of remedies" has served indiscriminately to describe
substantive elections as well as elections between remedial rights,
even when the distinction was appreciated. The reason for this
interchange is fairly explicable. Historically, perhaps it is truer
than any rigid analytical division would be. Researches into the
system of common law writs have justified the conclusion that
the substantive rights of property and status in our law are largely
the creation of specialized remedies. First came the remedies and
then the rights. Thus procedural matters were not mere incidents
in the enforcement of ascertained rights: they were the presuppositions, and the substantive rights their implications.'
Even
today, when rights are more clearly defined than was true at common law, and remedial law has become of distinctly' secondary importance, there are no hard and fast lines of distinction: the substantive and adjective law often merge and become indistinguishable. Nevertheless it remains important to keep the well defined
cases of each class distinct.
The other reason for the confusion is closely allied. It arises
from the method of viewing rights in terms of the allegations
necessary to support a cause of action for their assertion. Especially is this true when acts of substantive election are themselves acts in litigation. So, where the vendee under a fraudulent
sale sues in deceit, it is often said that he has exercised an election of remedies and cannot afterwards resort to a suit for recission of the contract of sale, when it is plain that what is meant is
that by affirming the sale the vendee is precluded from ever disaffirming, and that commencement of suit for damages is a decisive act of affirmance."
For purposes of clear definition therefore, we shall employ
"election of remedies" for the choosing of procedural rights alone,
'Law begins by granting remedies; by allowing actions. In time
we generalize from these actions and perceive rights behind them."
Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 204.

""It could not affirm the existence of a contract of sale. for the

purpose of a recovery under it, and subsequently treat the contract as
avoided by the fraud of the vendee. . . . This is the principle upon which
is based the doctrine of election of remedies, where two exist in a given
case which are substantially inconsistent." Droege v. Ahrens & Ott Etc.,
(igoo) 163 N. Y. 466, 57 N. E. 747.
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after a party's substantive rights have been wholly ascertained.
B finds that he has a cause of action against A for the wrongful
taking of B's horse. His rights are clearly settled. He may redress the wrong by suit in either of two ways: in trover, or in
assumpsit. This is the plainest case for an election of remedies.
"Election" we shall reserve to describe a choice between substantive rights. We shall defer all consideration of the nature
of election of remedies, until we have outlined the character of
"election." We shall select only typical situations throughout
the substantive law.
Executed Conitracts of Sale. Let us suppose the following
case. The assignee of an insolvent debtor, who sold goods in
fraud of creditors, brings ction against the vendee on notes given
by him for the price of the goods, and secures the demand by attaching his property, but never brings the action to trial. Later
he sues the vendee in trover to recover the value of the goods. He
adopts the theory that the sale was void as to creditors, and that
he, as representative of the creditors, may avoid the sale and reclaim the goods, or on refusal to deliver sue for the conversion.
The vendee pleads the prior action on the notes.
The sufficiency of the plea can be determined only by considering the substantive rights of the assignee when he learns of
the fraudulent sale. The sale was not illegal, nor ipso facto void,
nor could the fraudulent party avoid it. It was only voidable
at the option of the creditors of the vendor or the assignee on their
behalf. The assignee may affirm or disaffirm the sale as he
pleases, but he is forever bound by his election. If he finds it
more beneficial for the creditors to collect the notes than to attempt recovery of the property, he may sue on the notes. But
thereby he necessarily affirms the sale and can never more sue to
recover the goods. If he sues to recover the goods instead, he
disaffirms the sale and repudiates the notes.
The situation arose in the leading case of Butler v. Hildreth,'
and Chief Justice Shaw analyzed it in this way:
"The assignee has an election, not of remedies merely, but of
rights. But an assertion of one is necessarily a renunciation of
the other. This results from the plain and very obvious con0(I842) 5 Met. 49. But see Powers v. Benedict, (1882) 88 N. Y.
6o5, that effort by the vendor to retake the entire property when successful in part only does not bar his right to pursue the vendee for the

value of the unfound portion, nor is his effort a defense to an action to
recover possession against one in whose hands the part is found.
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sideration, that the assignee cannot affirm the sale in part, and
disaffirm it in part; if it is to stand as a valid sale, the property
of the goods remains vested in the purchaser, and he remains
liable for the price. But if the sale is avoided and set aside, it
stands as if it had never been made; the property may be taken
possession of by the representative of the creditors as if no sale
had been made, and the purchaser ceases to be liable for the price.
When therefore the assignee has made that election, if he receives
or demands the price, it is equivalent to an express declaration
that he does not impeach the sale, and has no claim to the goods.
But if he takes possession of the goods, or demands them of the
purchaser, on the ground that the sale was void as to creditors,
it is equivalent to a renunciation of all claim for the price."
It should be noted that in the instant case, bringing suit was
not an election of remedies. Its significance was in the field of
real election. It was an unequivocal declaration by the assignee
that he had chosen to affirm the sale. All rights were now determined. The assignee could never afterwards lay claim to the
property.
Affirmance. From this analysis may be drawn the general
legal consequence of a conclusive affirmance of a voidable e.&ecuted transaction. When the vendee discovers that he has been
induced to enter a contract of sale by reason of fraudulent representations of the vendor, he may elect to affirm or repudiate the
sale.'1 If with knowledge of his right he commences action for
damages in deceit, he is conclusively bound by an election to affirm the sale and cannot afterwards bring action to rescind. Of
course, he may sue in deceit and also compel delivery of the goods,
since both actions proceed on the theory of affirmance and are
therefore consistent. The rights of the defrauded vendor are
the same. He may affirm the sale by any decisive step. Commencement of suit on notes given in payment, or acceptance of
money with knowledge of his rights conclusively binds him." For
instance, in a conditional sale of personalty title may be reserved
during the credit period, with option in the vendor in default of
payment either to retake possession or to conclude the sale. Suppose the vendee resells, and the vendor files claim in bankruptcy
against him. Later he attempts to recover the goods. By filing
in bankruptcy the vendor affirms the sale; thereby property' passes
"Droege v. Ahrens, & Ott, (19oo) 163 N. Y. 466, 57 N. E. 747; loller v. Tuska, (1881) 87 N. Y. 166; Conrow v. Little, (1889) 115 N.,Y. 387,
22 N. E. 346, 5 L. R. A. 693. •
'N. Y. Land Imp. Co. v. Chapman, (i8go) Ii8 N. Y. 288, 23 N. E.
187; Bulkley v. Morgan (1878) 46 Conn. 393.
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irrevocably to the vendee. His resale is legal, and the conditional
vendor cannot sue for the goods. This was the decision in American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., which is,
absurdly enough, decided in the language of election of remedies,
and cited as a leading case on that subject.
"In this case the plaintiff had its election to maintain its relation as owner of the property or to treat the title as having passed and to sue for the value or price thereof. Either remedy could
have been adopted, but not both, for the reason that to do so
would assert inconsistent relations between the parties with reference to the property. The plaintiff pursued a remedy in the
bankruptcy court for the price of the property, which necessarily
conceded that the title to the property had passed from the plaintiff." 3
Similarly in an unconditional sale action in replevin for chattels by the vendee, or assumpsit by the vendor for the price would
be a conclusive affirmance, and preclude further action to rescind.
Disaffirmance. The converse case, where at the time of election there is an attempt to repudiate the sale and recover the property parted with, is more difficult. The difficulty lies generally
in the circumstance that, while affirmance is always unifactoral,
rescission in the case of the sale of land is bilateral and partakes
of the nature of a contractual act. The defrauded vendee in a
land contract cannot return title to the vendor by his own act. In
the absence of agreement, an equitable action for rescission is
necessary. And if plaintiff fails for want of equity, or for some
reason that does not go to the merits and foreclose his right of
action, his gesture has been impotent. The sale still subsists as a
valid transaction. Thereafter the vendee may bring action or
damages in deceit and recover judgment, except when barred, as
was said, on the familiar principles of res adjudicata. The situaS(,9O8) 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942, 16 Ann. Cas. 1O54;. Acc. Wright v.
Pierce (1875) 4 Hun 351. The case undoubtedly correct, by the doctrine
in force in the bankruptcy courts, that a secured creditor cannot prove
for the full amount of his claim without surrendering his security. But
apart from bankruptcy, it is certainly questionable whether, the conditional vendor should be required to choose between the property and an
action for the price. Mr. Williston urges that a conditional sale is essentially a chattel mortgage. Williston, Sales, sec. 330, 579. Under that
view, the vendor should be allowed to 'proceed in the same way as the
mortgagee of a chattel, by suing for the price and retaining title until
his debt be satisfied. The Minnesota court has always taken the contrary position, Minneapolis Harvester Works v. Hally, (1881) 27 Minn.
495, and other cases collected in 3 Dunnell's Dig. sec. 8651 and Dunnell's Suppl. same section.
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tion is more simple in the case of a chattel. Here the defrauded
vendee may throw back the title by his own act. Whether this is
because a rescission of the sale of chattels is non-contractual, or
whether, as Mr. Ewart explains," because the original agreement
stipulates for such a right in the vendee, is here immaterial. By
a positive declaration of his will to rescind, as by tender of the
benefit, or by commencement of suit for rescission, the transfer
of title is rescinded. The vendee cannot afterwards sue for
damages in deceit; or for breach of warranty. Such action would
presuppose the existence of a valid obligation. The rights of the
vendor of chattels after rescission are similar."
Summary. Now all that has been decided in regard to the
necessity and conclusiveness of an election in the foregoing cases
is perfectly acceptable. For the requirements of commerce, a
great measure of certainty in executed transactions is imperative.
Buyers and sellers of goods cannot keep their affairs in an equivocal position for an indefinite time. It is true that there need be
no immediate election. For a reasonable time one may wait and
consider, and during that time may do acts consistent with either
position. But eventually some act must mark "the point at which
the line of equivocal acts ends, the dividing of the way after
which one step in either direction excludes any progress in the
other."" For a man "cannot say at one time that a transaction is
valid, and thereby obtain some advantage to which he could only
be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and at another time say
it is void for the purpose of securing some further advantage.."
Executory Contracts. The general principles governing the
rights. of a person induced to enter into a contract voidable for
fraud or other reason, are well settled." The analysis of the previous cases of executed transactions is determinative of them. In
general these actions are decisive acts of affirmance: a suit for
specific performance by either party (possible only in land contracts and other exceptional obligations) ; a suit for reformation
and enforcement as reformed; an action for damages for breach,
or to recover a specific sum due upon the contract, or for damages
in deceit.' In general, the following conclude a party's disaffirm"Ewart, Waiver 75.
'Williston, Sales, sec. 567-569. Cf. Nash v. 'inn. Title Ins. Co.,
(i895) 163 Mass. 574 40 N. E. io3g.
W16 Law Quar. Rev. 16i.
"Smith v. Baker, (1873) L. R. 8 C. P. 350, 5 Moak's Rep. 323.
'McGibbon v. Schmidt, (i9i6) 5i Cal. Dec. 195, 4 Cal. L. R. 346.
"Connihan v. Thompson, (1873) III Mass. 270.
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ance: assumpsit to recover the purchase price paid in accordance with the contract, when pursued far enough to effect rescission; replevin for goods delivered in pursuance of the agreement; ejectment for recovery of possession of land, etc. Where
they are consistent, one action does not bar the other. For example, where a lender of money recovers judgment on a note given
as security, the judgment unsatisfied is no bar to a further action
for damages for fraudulent representation."0
Principaland Agent. Another instance of substantive election
is found in the doctrine of ratification of unauthorized acts, a
branch of the law of principal and agent. C, without authority,
presumes to contract with A in the name of, or on behalf of B.
If B adopts and ratifies the act of C, it becomes binding on him
as if he had been originally a party to it, from the date of inception of the agreement. Of course, B may ignore what C has
assumed to do for him, or may affirmatively repudiate it, and then
no contractual obligation arises. But if B elects to accept, he
"becomes immediately liable upon the contract9 and liable as well
for any fraud committed by the agent in its formation, or any
tort connected with its performance."'" If B elects to ratify, but
does so under misapprehension of the essential facts relating to
the transaction, he may afterwards repudiate all liability. But
when made with full knowledge, ratification, by claim of benefits or otherwise, is conclusive upon him."
In a very recent case before the Court of Appeals in England,'
the facts showed that B had delivered margarine to C, forwarding agent and carrier, to be carried to Hull, and then forwarded
as B should direct. The goods had been originally consigned to
A, a buying agent of B; but on arrival at Hull B instructed C not
to deliver to A. Contrary to orders, C did deliver to A, who resold. After notice of the misdelivery, B invoiced the goods to A,
sued and recovered judgment for the price of the goods as sold
and delivered, and proceeded in bankruptcy against A. Now B
"Oben v. Adams, (1915) 89 Vt. 158, 94 Atl. 5o6, 15 Col. L. R. 631.

"Huffcut, Agency, 2nd Ed., 6o; Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., sec. 490 ff.
"Robb v. Voss, (1894) 155 U. S. 13, 15 S. C. R. 4,39 L. Ed. 52; Huffcut, 2agency, 2nd Ed., 42ff.
' Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands S. S. Co. Ltd..,
[1921] 2 K. B. 6o8. Though no precedents were cited on the point, the
case was governed by a line of authorities, chiefly Armstrong v. Allen,
(1893) 67 L. T. 738; Smith v. Baker, (1873) L. R. 8 C. P. 35o. See also
16 Law Quar. Rev. i6o, for criticism of the case of Rice v. Reed, (igoo)
i Q. B. 54, answered in 16 Law Quar. Rev. 379.
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sues C for negligence and breach of duty. C pleads that B was
concluded by his election to sue A. Judgment is given for C, and
affirmed on appeal. The ground of the decision is not so well defined as one might wish. Scrutton L. J. intimates that the case is
one of waiving a conversion and suing in assumpsit-a true case
of election of remedies. But Bankes and Atkins L. JJ. base the
decision on the conclusiveness of the ratification of C's act. Per
Bankes L. J:
"When the appellants discovered this (the misdelivery) they had
a right to elect; they might refuse to recognize the action of the
respondents in delivering the goods to Beilin ('A), and sue them
for conversion or breach of duty, or they might recognize and
adopt the act of the respondents and sue Beilin for goods sold
and delivered. They elected to take the latter course, and they
sued Beilin to judgment. Having elected to treat the delivery to
him as an authorized delivery they cannot treat the same act as
a conversion.""
In a like connection Mr. Ewart criticizes the statement, so
often found in the cases, that the rule of election of remedies is
to be found when "it is held that one who has sued on the theory
that an unauthorized act done in his name has been ratified, cannot
afterwards maintain an action on the theory that such act, and the
assumed agency of the person by whom it was performed have
been -repudiated," in this terse manner:
"This is a case of election between two rights and not between
two remedies. It is not a case of choice between different methods
of enforcing one ascertained right but a selection of the right to be
enforced. It is an option between two legal situations; and, when
one of them has been selected, there are not two possible remedies
"For an uncritical comment on the case see 35 H. L. R. 209. The
note-writer argues that by suing Beilin, B acknowledges that he has
title, but does not relieve C from liability for breach of duty. The two
cases cited in support of this contention are no authority for such a
doctrine. Pacific Vinegar & Pickle Works v. Smith, (9o7) 152 Cal. 507,
93 Pac. 85 would allow recovery against the agent after ratification of a
sale made by him only in case the agent had ostensible authority to make
the sale, and the principal therefore could not have rescinded the sale.
Robinson Mfachine Works v. Vorse, (1879) 52 Ia. 207, 2 N. V. II08, is
either decided on the ground that there was no ratification in law, or is
unsupportable. No cases were cited in the opinion. See Huffcut, Agency.
2nd Ed., 6o-61; Mechem, Agency. 2nd Ed., Sec. 490-494, 440, 1249, 1268.
1324. See Triggs v. Jones, (18g1) 46 Minn. 277, 48 N. N'V. 1113: "by a
ratification of an unauthorized act, the principal absolves the agent from
all responsibility for loss or damage growing out of the unauthorized
transaction, and [that] thenceforward the principal assumes the responsibility of the transaction, with all its advantages and all its burdens,"
per Mitchell J.. Whether a contrary doctrine might not have been preferable is quite a different question, and is, of course, arguable.
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but one only. If the act be ratified there is but one remedy; and
if it be repudiated there is another. The two remedies do not coexist.""
The probable reason for confusion in these cases is that the
act determinative of the plaintiff's right is the commencement of
a legal action.
Insurance. A much more difficult situation arises in the
case of an ordinary insurance policy, for instance, a fire policy.
The contract generally provides that it shall be void in a number
of events, e. g., if the insured is not the sole and unconditional
owner of the property, or if there is other prior insurance, of if
inflammable materials be brought upon the premises. In any of
these events, the insurance company has the right to cancel the
policy. This, Mr. Ewart argues with much persuasiveness, is a
plain case of election: the policy does not become ipso facto void
upon breach, but only voidable at the election of the company."
By this analysis a duty rests on the company to communicate
promptly to the insured its election to terminate, for silence on its
part will be evidence of election to continue the contract, or by
lapse of time will put an end to its right to elect. The courts generally take a different view of the problem, and reason that the
breach of condition is itself a forfeiture of the policy; then the
insured may introduce testimony of a "waiver" of the forfeiture
(more correctly, of the breach) and revivor of the policy by the
company. That is to say, the insured is allowed to testify that the
agent of the company knew of the facts constituting the breach
of contract when he delivered the policy, accepted the premium, or
otherwise treated the policy as in force. This leads to the inference that the parties intended to ignore the condition or its breach.
It is a question of insurance law, not pertinent here, whether in
reality the insured incurs a true folfeiture making the policy ipso
facto void, and requiring a waiver by the company to reinstate it,
or, on the other hand, whether the breach allows the company, for
whose protection the condition was made, to elect to cancel the
contract or not as it pleases.
Landlord and Tenant. The simplest case is this: The ordinary lease of real property provides that the lease shall be void if
43

Ewart, Waiver 70.
'Ewart, Waiver; 12 Col. L. R. 619; 13 Col. L. R. 51; 18 II. L. R.
364; 29 H. L. R. 458; 29 H. L. R. 724; Williston, Sales, sec. 192.
"See Vance, Insurance 346 if; 12 Col. L. R. 134.
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the tenant defaults in the rent on the stipulated rent days. Usually,
this does not mean that the lease will then become automatically
void; it will only be voidable by reentry or otherwise at the option
of the landlord. On breach of the covenant to pay rent, the landlord has his election: He may" cancel the lease on account of the
breach, or he may continue the tenancy notwithstanding the breach.
If he cancels the lease, it cannot be revived except by the creation
of a new tenancy. If he elects to continue, his right to terminate
is then lost, until there is another default in the rent, or other breach
sufficient to warrant a forfeiture.'
This is an election between
substantive rights. Whichever course he pursues, the remedies
available are all consistent with his determined rights. If he elects
to terminate, hemay sue to recover possession and may also collect
back rent, though not subsequent rent. If he elects to continue
the tenancy, he may sue for rent and upon the covenant for any
damages he has sustained."
We have here followed the same analysis of Mr. Ewart; but,
since the question of "waiver" is of much less importance than it
has become in insurance law, the ordinary analysis by the courts
in terms of forfeiture of lease, and "waiver" of breach, leads to
identical conclusions as to the substantive rights of the parties,
through terminology less exact, but sufficiently adequate for the
simplicity of the transaction.'
The same situation exists at the termination of a lease; the
landlord may elect to permit the former lessee to remain there
longer as a tenant, or to treat him merely as a trespasser. If the
landlord elects to treat him as a trespasser, the former lessee by
remaining in possession does not enlarge the character of the tenancy. Therefore the landlord cannot later enforce a claim for rent,
unless there has been a new contract of tenancy."
Partnership. One important instance of election in the law
of partnership has arisen, and should be considered here because it
is often incorrectly cited as a case for the application of the rule of
election of remedies, whereas in fact the election is one between.
substantive rights. In Scarf v. Jardine," A and B carrying on
Underhill, Landlord and Tenant 649.
"Cole, Ejectment 82' (Preliminary points). But see also Ibid 408410 (waiver of forfeiture), Jones v. Carter (1846) 15 Mees. & W. 718.
"See Croft v. Lumley, (1858) 6 H. L. C. 705, 27 L. J. Q. B. 321, per
48I

Bramwell B.; Conger v. Duryee, (1882) 9o N. Y. 6oo.
"I Wood, Landlord and Tenant 38, sec. 13.

'[1882]

7 A. C. 345, 16 Law Quar. Rev. i6o.
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business as B & Co, dissolved partnership by the retirement of A.
B took another partner, C, and with C carried on business under
the old firm style of B & Co. Plaintiff, a customer of the old firm
of A and B, sold and delivered goods to the new firm of B and C
after the change, but without notice of it. On receiving notice of the
change, he sued B and C for the price, and upon their bankruptcy
proved against their estate. Now he brings action against A for
the price. The court holds that plaintiff at his option might have
sued A and B, or B and C, but not the three together; and that by
electing to sue B and C he had abandoned his right to sue A.
"He [plaintiff] had the undoubted right to select his debtor,
to hold either the old firm or the new firm responsible to him for
the fulfillment of the contract; but I know of no authority for the
proposition that the respondent could hold his contract to have
been made with both firms, or that having chosen to proceed against
one of these firms for recovery of his debt he could thereafter treat
the other firm as his debtor."'
When a "corporation by estoppel" incurs liability, there may be
the same election by its creditors to treat the members as an association or as individuals. In Clausen v. Head," an action was
brought against defendants as partners. They had pretended to
be a corporation, and had now assigned for creditors. Plaintiff
had presented his claim to the assignee, but the assignee had disallowed it. The case squarely raised the question whether former
action against the defendants had barred the plaintiff's suit. The
court discussed the rights of the creditor in this way:
"He could proceed against the association outside of or in the
assignment proceedings, as a corporation, or against the members
thereof as partners. Having made an election between two
courses with knowledge of the facts, he waiyed the one not chosen.
• At best he had two remedies which were inconsistent, one
against the corporation, and one against the members thereof. He
was where he could take either of two roads, but not both. The
roads reached out in different directions, so that to travel one necessarily required the abandonment of the other. . . . His situation was no better than that of a person who had dealt with another as principal, when such other is in fact the agent for third
persons, such person can pursue either the ostensible or actual
principal at his election, but not both.' '
'For criticism of the decision see Ewart, Estoppel 516-518, 526-528,

Burdick, Partnership, 3rd Ed., 71; Lindley, Partnership, 7th Ed., 78.

) 11O Wis. 405, 85 N. W. 1O28, 84 A. S. R. 933.
'The illustration is unfortunate, for there seem to be no cases that
hold a third person barred, short of merger of the cause of action by
judgment, Kingsley v. Davis, (i87o) 1o4 Mass. 178; VWambaugh, Cases
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ELECTION BETWEEN REMIEDIAL RIGHTS

"Election," we have seen, describes generically the act of choosing one of several rights or remedies. We have traced the effect
of an election in two of the *great categories, namely, between
properties, and between substantive rights. We have found that
election had significant legal effect only when the rights or properties to be chosen from were mutually inconsistent. The equitable
doctrine of election requires one who accepts benefits under a deed
or will, to conform to the entire intention expressed in the instrument and to abandon every right which would defeat its provisions.
It is described briefly as the rule that in equity one cannot occupy
two inconsistent positions. Similarly the principle of substantive
election, as that one cannot affirm and disaffirm the same contract,
rests upon the logic that a man cannot at different times insist on
the truth of each of two inconsistent provisions. The third type
of election now to be considered, is by definition though unfortunately not always by use, confined to procedural rights alone. It
deals with the"method of enforcing a determined right. The rule
of election of remedies describes the legal effect of making a choice
between remedial rights. Its effect, so all the authorities repeat, is
to bar recourse to any inconsistent remedies.
An appreciation of this fact, that the rule of election of remedies is a matter of pleading, concerned with the adjective law and
not with the substantive law, is a point of departure for a discrimon Agency 7o2; Priestly v. Fernie, (1865) 3 Hurl. & C. 977, Wambaugh,
Cases 698; (contra, Beymer v. Bonsall, (1875) 79 Pa. 298, that even
unsatisfied judgment was no bar to a subsequent action), by an election
to regard either the agent or the undisclosed principal responsible,
though there seems also to be no reason on principle why the doctrine
should not apply. Merrill v. Kenyon, (188o) 48 Conn. 314, Wambaugh,
Cases'on Agency 720; Curtiss v. Williamson, (1874) L. R. IO Q. B. 57,
Wambaugh, Cases 713; Hutchinson v. Wheeler, (1862) 3 Allen (Mass.)
577, Wambaugh, Cases 725; Cobb v. Knapp, (1877) 71 N. Y. 348, 27
Am. Rep. 51, Wambaugh, Cases 726.
Thus in Lindquist v. Dickson,
(19o6) 98 Minn. 369, lO7 N. W. 958, an action to recover from defendant as an undisclosed principal on a contract made by her husband, as her
agent, defendant pleaded in bar a prior judgment against the agent. The
court adopted the rule of Kingsley v. Davis, supra, saying: "We therefore hold upon principle, and what seems to be the weight of judicial
opinion, that: If a person contracts with another who is in fact an
agent of an undisclosed principal, and, after learning all the facts, brings
an action on the contract and recovers judgment against the agent, such
judgment will be a bar to an action against the principal. But an unsatisfied judgment against the agent is not a bar to an action against
the undisclosed principal when discovered, if the plaintiff was ignorant
of the facts as to the agency when he prosecuted his action against the
agent."
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ination of the cases. That a vendee who has sued for breach of
warranty in sale of a chattel, cannot afterwards rescind and sue for
his money back is a clear proposition of law. But we have seen
that it treats only of substantive rights. The vendee had an election to treat the contract as in force or to sue to annul it. That
he cannot do both must be obvious. But it is not a case for an
election of remedies. A true election of remedies arises only after
the plaintiff has determined his substantive rights, and finds that
he has two forms of action available to redress the identical wrong.
The extent of the rule, in its specific sense, is thus strictly limited. Only after subtracting the cases that involve a choice of
substantive rights, can we discover the genuine cases of election of
remedies. But even after such a subtraction, when all substantive
rights are known to be determined, it is hornbook knowledge that
in the great preponderance of cases a suitor may prosecute one or
all of his remedies. "He may select and adopt one as better
adapted than the others to work out his purpose, but his choice is
not compulsory or final."'
Until satisfaction is had, in the absence of facts creating an equitable estoppel or merger by judgment, or bar by res adjudicata, it is axiomatic that pursuit of one
remedy does not preclude resort to the others. The question is
regularly dismissed with the statement that the remedies are analogous, consistent, and concurrent. Thus, "all consistent remedies
may in general be pursued concurrently even to final adjudication;
but the satisfaction of the claim by one remedy puts an end to the
other remedy."" Examples of this fact might be cited at will.
Restitution proceedings and ejectment for land are cumulative
remedies, and election of one does not bar the other. Similarly,
a creditor holding collateral security for his claim may prosecute
simultaneously his actions on the principal and collateral obligations, e. g., on a promissory note and on the original debt,' on the
property pledged or against the pledgor personally.' And one
'Dilley v. Simmons Nat. Bank, (1913)

ioS Ark. 342, 158 S. W. 144.

"7"No matter what right the party wronged may have of electing between remedies or of pursuing different defendants for the same cause
of action, when he once obtains full satisfaction from one source, his

cause of action ends, and he can assert it no further," MUcLendon v.
Finch, (I9o8)

2 Ga. App. 421, 58 S. E. 69o.
iMcKinnon v. Johnson, (i91o) .5o Fla. 332, 52 So. 288.

"Alexander v. Righter, (1912) 21 Pa. Dist. 842. Likewise on the
debt of a partnership and the collateral note of a partner. Parsons Partnership, 4th Ed., sec. 89, page 95, note i. Also Corn Exchange Ins. Co. v.
Babcock, (1867) 8 Abb. Pa. (N.S.) 256.
"Ricks v.Johnson. (1917) 62 0 kl. 125, 162 Pac. 476.
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suing in assumpsit under a statute for damages from a fraud may
after dismissal bring an action on the case for the same fraud."
Another clear instance is the case of a joint wrong. An action
against a bank to recover stock or its value does not bar action
against the defendant for false representations in obtaining the
stock from the plaintiff." All these are cases where the rule of
election admittedly does not apply to co-existing remedies.
What then are the authentic cases in which courts have applied
the rule of election to remedies? It must be already apparent that
the possible residuum that must embrace every such case is fairly
restricted. Even then, in view of the confident assertions to be
found everywhere, the result revealed by a search of the cases is
astonishing. It is said that "the doctrine of election is not restricted to any class of remedies. Thus a party may be required
to elect between two or more actions ex contractu, or two or more
ex delicto, or between remedies one or more of which belong to one
class and one or more to the other or between remedies all equitable, or remedies one or more of which are equitable and the residue of legal cognizance." '
But the results belie such extravagant
statements. In the books there seem to be only two cases where
the rule has ever in fact been applied to remedies. We shall set
them out at some length, but without any analysis of their theoretical justification.
The most important case is the wrongful taking of a chattel.
Originally the remedies of the plaintiff were confined to the writs
of trover, trespass, and, in case the property remained in the possession of the wrongdoer, replevin. But in order to facilitate redress, the remedy of assumpsit was added. Dean Ames writes :"
"It was decided accordingly in Phillips v. Tiompson,' 1675, that
assumpsit would not lie for the proceeds of a conversion. But
in the following year the usurper of an office was charged in assumpsit for the profits of the office, no objection being taken to
the form of action' . . . Assumpsit soon became concurrent with
trover, where the goods had been sold." Finally, under the influence of Lord Mansfield, the action was so much encouraged
that it became almost the universal remedy where the defendant
" 1Mintz v. Jacob, (igio) 163 Mich. 280, 128 N. W. 211.
'Maxwell v. Martin ,(igo9) i3o App. Div. 80, I14 N. Y. S. 349.
'2o Corpus Juris, sec. 6.
"Ames, Lectures Legal History 164.
'3 Lev. 191.
"Woodward v. Aston, (i616) 2 Mod. 95.
'Lamine v. Dorrell, (07o5) Ld. Raym. 1216.
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had received money which he was 'obliged by the ties of natural
justice and equity to refund.' "'
Thus today it is well settled that the owner may sue in tort for
the value or in assumpsit for the price. And while a replevin
action is not barred by an action in trover which has not gone to
judgment, it is equally well settled that the rule is to the contrary,
when either action is on implied contract. A non-suit in trover
would not prevent replevin any more than a non-suit in account
would prevent debt. But when the suit is in assumpsit, the rule
is different. Thus in Thompson v. Howard,' plaintiff sued in
tort for enticement of his minor son into the service of the defendant. The defendant pleaded a prior action in assumpsit for
the value of the boy's services, which had been discontinued by
disagreement of the jury. It was held that the plaintiff was barred. "The election involved in the first suit precluded the plaintiff from maintaining this action for the wrong." Though the
plaintiff could have brought another action in assumpsit, he could
no longer sue in tort. Even when the defendants are joint tort
feasors by joinder in the conversion, the result is the same. In
Terry v. Munger," it was held that an unsatisfied judgment against
one of two joint tort feasors, obtained in an action in assumpsit,
was a bar to an action in trover against the other tort feasor. But
on this point there is authority to the contrary.'
The Qther instance is that of election between an action in
assumpsit for rents and profits, and action in ejectment coupled
with damages for mesne profits, in case of a cotenancy. A and
B are tenants in common of an estate. A takes the whole of the
rents and profits, though B is entitled to a moiety. At common
law no action would lie unless A had been appointed bailiff by B.'
But by early statute in England" an action of account was provided, as though A were in fact bailiff. The statute was held to
'Jacob v. Allen, (1703) I Salk. 27; Longchamp v. Kenney, (779)
1
Doug. 137; Hambly v. Trott, (1776) i Cowp. 371 (375) ; Addison, Torts
33.
"(1875) 31 Mich. 312 Acc. Nield v. Burton (1882) 49 Mich. 53, where
the suit in assumpsit failed because the court did not have jurisdiction.
"(1890) 121 N. Y. 16I, 24 N. E. 272, I8 A. S. R. 8o3, 8 L. R. A. 216.
"Huffman v. Hughlett, (1883) II Lea (Tenn.) 549; Kirkman v.
Phillips' Heirs, (1871) 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 222; Cohen v. Goldman, (1878)
43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 436.
2

Co. Lit. 172a, 200b; Wheeler v. Horne, (174o)

Willes 208; Bac.

Abr. Joint-tenants, (L) Vol. IV, p. 517 (7th Ed.), Dane's Abr. Ch. 8,
Art. 3, Sec. I3; Vin. Abr., Joint-tenants (R a. pl. 14). See Hurley v.
Lamoreaux, (1882) 29 Minn. 138, 12 N. W. 447.
34 & 5 Anne, c. 16, sec. 27.
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be a part of the common law of Massachusetts.". B need only
allege and prove his tenancy, and that A has received more than
his just share. Where the action of account at law is obsolete or
abolished, indebitatus assumpsit in the same case undoubtedly
lies. But suppose B sued in ejectment or by real action instead,
and recovered judgment on his title and possession. He could
then recover the profits for the intermediate time in an action of
trespass, but his remedy in assumpsit would be gone."
(To be conthnuted)
"Brigham v. Eveleth, (1813) 9 Mass. 538; Jones v. Harraden, (1813)
9 Mass. 540 N.

"sMunroe v. Luke, (1840) 1 Met. 459; Bigelow, Estoppel 718.

